Satisfaction with democracy and voter turnout: A temporal perspective by Ezrow, L & Xezonakis, G
  
 
 
 
Satisfaction with Democracy and Voter Turnout: A Temporal Perspective 
 
 
Lawrence Ezrow 
University of Essex  
Department of Government 
Wivenhoe Park 
Colchester CO4 3SQ 
United Kingdom 
 
 
Georgios Xezonakis 
University of Gothenburg 
Department of Political Science 
Quality of Government Institute 
Sprängkullsgatan 19 
Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
Forthcoming, Party Politics 
 
 
 
 
An earlier version was presented at the Workshop “How Do Electoral Systems and Party 
Systems Affect Satisfaction with Democracy?” held in London on February 1st, 2013. The 
authors thank the anonymous reviewers, Jim Adams, André Blais, Ruth Dassonneville, Bob 
Goodin, Tim Hellwig, Simon Hix, Sara Hobolt, Annie Jones, and especially Mark Franklin for 
insightful comments on earlier drafts.  
  
  
 
 
 
Bios 
 
Lawrence Ezrow is a Professor of Government at the University of Essex, UK. His research 
interests include political representation and parties’ election strategies, and his articles have 
been published in the American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, World Politics, 
and other journals. 
 
Georgios Xezonakis is a Post Doctoral Research Fellow at Gothenburg University, Quality of 
Government Institute. His previous work appears in Comparative Political Studies, Electoral 
Studies, and other journals. 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Satisfaction with Democracy and Voter Turnout: A Temporal Perspective 
 
Numerous studies conclude that countries in which citizens express higher levels of satisfaction 
with democracy also tend to display higher levels of voter turnout in national elections. Yet it is 
difficult to draw causal inferences from this positive cross-sectional relationship, 
because democracies feature many historical, cultural, and institutional differences that are not 
easily controlled for in cross-sectional comparisons. We apply an alternative, temporal, approach 
to this issue by asking the question: Are over-time declines (increases) in aggregate levels of 
satisfaction within democracies associated with increases (declines) in levels of voter turnout 
within these democracies? Our temporal analysis of this relationship in 12 democracies over the 
period 1976-2011 reveals a pattern that is the opposite of that suggested by previous cross-
sectional studies: namely, we find that over-time increases in citizens satisfaction with 
democracy are associated with significant decreases in voter turnout in national elections in these 
countries.  
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 We analyze voter turnout and its relationship to citizen satisfaction with democracy. 
Cross-national empirical studies on voter turnout suggest that levels of citizen satisfaction are 
linked to voter turnout (e.g., Franklin 2002, 2004; Clarke et al. 2004; Karp and Banducci 
2008; Norris 2002; Anderson and Guillory 1997; for European Parliament elections, see 
Hobolt 2012). The logic that supports this observed relationship is that citizens who are more 
satisfied with democracy tend to be more politically engaged, and thus they are more likely to 
turn out to vote.  
By contrast, there are theoretical considerations from the work of prominent scholars that 
contradict this conventional wisdom. While citizen satisfaction with democracy has long been 
tied to voter turnout, there is an equally strong consensus that dissatisfaction leads to higher 
levels of more direct unconventional forms of political participation (Gurr 1970). Furthermore, 
the distinction between unconventional forms of participation and conventional forms of political 
participation has blurred because citizens may seek change through multiple channels, from 
protest to voting (Norris 2002; see also Lijphart 1997). Dissatisfaction with democracy will 
generate demand for change in the electorate, which in turn motivates a higher level of turnout. 
In a nutshell, when explaining theories of conventional modes of political participation (i.e., 
voting), we should not ignore the factors that contribute to alternative forms of participation.   
 We address the relationship between satisfaction and turnout by asking the question: 
what is the nature of this relationship within countries across time? While cross-national 
empirical studies of turnout far outnumber longitudinal studies, it is problematic to assume 
that the cross-sectional relationships identified in these cross-national studies must be 
identical to the over-time relationships within countries (Franklin 2004: 14; see also Blais 
2006).1   
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 Relating to this argument, Mark Franklin (2004: 14) comments, “Are comparisons between countries 
equivalent to comparisons over time? Most scholars studying aggregate turnout levels have implicitly assumed 
that if they can identify factors that are associated with differences between countries, these same factors will 
account for why turnout changes over time. A country with low turnout is assumed to have the characteristics 
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We address this point directly, and evaluate whether the relationship documented in 
cross-national studies between citizen satisfaction and turnout holds in longitudinal analyses 
(within countries over time). And the answer we provide is no: the cross-sectional relationship 
between satisfaction and turnout that we observe between countries is the opposite of the 
over-time relationships that that we observe within countries. When electorates report lower 
levels of satisfaction with democracy, voter turnout actually increases. This supports the 
argument that is developed in the next section that dissatisfaction generates demand for 
change in the electorate, which in turn mobilizes citizens to engage in, amongst other forms of 
participation, voting.  
 
Expectations about the Relationship between Satisfaction and Turnout 
 
Cross-national studies, based on the aggregate- and individual-levels, have documented a 
clear positive relationship between satisfaction and turnout (see, e.g., Birch 2010; Clarke et al. 
2004; Franklin 2002, 2004; Grönlund and Setälä 2007; Hadjar and Beck 2010; Karp and 
Banducci 2008; Norris 2002; Powell 1986). It is nevertheless problematic to draw firm 
conclusions about causation.  The reason is that it is difficult to control for the vast number of 
economic, cultural, and institutional differences across countries. Although this previous 
research is comprehensive in its approach (see, e.g., Franklin 2004), it is nearly impossible to 
control for all of the differences in political culture, historical experiences, and other factors that 
would affect levels of turnout. There are numerous (minor) institutional differences 
between countries that can affect turnout including how long in advance people must register to 
vote; how many hours polling stations stay open; whether elections take place on weekends or 
workdays; whether businesses are required to give employees time off to go vote; whether voters 
                                                                                                                                                        
that a country with declining turnout is in the process of acquiring. But is this assumption reasonable? But does 
what we learn from comparing countries translate into an understanding of why turnout changes over time within 
one country?”  
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have to show photo identification; how convenient it is to travel to the local polling stations; 
what kinds of “turn out the vote” efforts political parties employ, and many additional factors. It 
is impossible to control for all these factors, which makes cross-sectional analysis, employed on 
its own, a problematic approach for analyzing the relationship between satisfaction and turnout. 
Over-time analyses may not perfectly control for all of these factors, but it seems to be an 
equally compelling approach to address the question.  
Are over-time changes in aggregate levels of satisfaction within democracies associated 
with changes in levels of voter turnout within these democracies? This is an interesting empirical 
question because there are considerations that point in conflicting directions. The considerations 
that suggest that increases in satisfaction are associated with increases in voter turnout are raised 
in the cross-national studies reviewed above. If aggregate satisfaction with democracy decreases, 
this could indicate a lack of trust or fulfilment in the democratic process. That is, voting in 
elections may not be seen as an effective way of communicating one’s preferences, and thus 
citizens should be less likely to turnout. Abstention could be viewed as a powerful signal for 
decreasing satisfaction (Grönlund and Setälä 2007).  Additionally, to the degree that civic duty 
plays a role in turnout, declining levels of satisfaction with democracy may also be accompanied 
by declining levels of civic duty (Goodin and Roberts 1975), and subsequently by declining 
levels of turnout.  
While the considerations discussed above suggest reasons why increases in aggregate 
levels of citizen satisfaction within democracies would lead to increases in levels of voter turnout 
in these democracies other considerations cast doubt on this widely accepted relationship. This 
argument unfolds in two steps: First, it is reasonable to associate dissatisfaction with a desire for 
change. And if citizens desire change, they will likely seek that change through multiple 
channels, including turning out for elections.  
4 
 
While most literature stresses the role of dissatisfaction (e.g. “relative deprivation”) in 
contributing to unconventional action (Gurr 1970), such a desire for change can equally affect 
conventional channels of political participation. Thus dissatisfaction should increase overall 
levels of political participation, including turnout in elections. Pippa Norris (2002), for example, 
links dissatisfaction (with public policy) to more peaceful forms of protest. With respect to 
voting, Norris (2002, 190-91) notes that, “early literature also drew an important line between 
“conventional” and “protest” forms of activism, and it is not clear whether this distinction 
remains appropriate today […] new social movements may be adopting mixed action repertoires 
combining traditional acts such as voting and lobbying with a variety of alternative modes, such 
as internet networking, street protests, consumer boycotts, and direct action.” 
Scholars who are concerned about unequal democracy echo similar sentiments. They 
emphasize that some citizens have disproportionate influence in democracy because these 
citizens participate, not by voting, protesting, or engaging in only one particular activity. Rather, 
these citizens are likely to engage in multiple forms of participation. Arguing for compulsory 
voting, Lijphart (1997) comments, “it is especially the more advantaged citizens who engage in 
these intensive modes of participation – both conventional activities such as working in election 
campaigns, contacting government officials, contributing money to parties or candidates, and 
working informally in the community (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978, 286-95) and unconventional 
activities like participation in demonstrations, boycotts, rent and tax strikes, occupying buildings, 
and blocking traffic (Marsh and Kaase 1979, 100, 112-26)” (Lijphart 1997, 1). If dissatisfaction 
increases levels of protest, it is also plausible that it will increase turnout.    
In sum, there are conflicting theoretical arguments on this interesting empirical question. 
Several cross-national studies report a positive relationship between satisfaction and turnout. 
They argue that satisfaction signals engagement with the political process, which enhances 
turnout. On the other hand, there are compelling reasons to expect that dissatisfaction with 
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democracy will generate demand for change in the electorate, which in turn motivates a higher 
level of turnout.  
The discussion above motivates the following two hypotheses:  
H1 (The Satisfied Voter Hypothesis): Increases in satisfaction with democracy cause 
increases in voter turnout.  
H2 (The Dissatisfied Voter Hypothesis): Decreases in satisfaction with democracy 
cause increases in voter turnout.   
Data and Measurement 
To test whether citizen satisfaction increases or depresses voter turnout we develop 
longitudinal, cross-national measures of voter turnout and citizen satisfaction with democracy. 
 
The Dependent Variable: Voter Turnout 
To test this relationship it is necessary to measure voter turnout. Most comparative 
studies of turnout emphasize the importance of cross-national comparability of the measure. 
Given the longitudinal nature of this study, it is more crucial that our measure of turnout is 
consistent over time, within countries. The longitudinal measure of voter turnout derives from 
the publications of the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). This dataset 
comprises regularly updated turnout figures for national elections dating back to 1945.2 In the 
models below the turnout figures are based on eligible voters (the potential number of voters 
that are of voting age). We also re-estimate the parameters for a model specification that 
measures voter turnout based on the total number of registered voters (Appendix 2, Model 3). 
In total we were able to collect turnout estimates that correspond with citizen satisfaction 
data, described below, from 1976 until 2011 in the 12 country sample.   
                                                 
2
 See http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm.  
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The distributions of the turnout variable are presented in Figure 1 for the twelve 
countries in the analysis. The box plots represent turnout levels in each country, and there are 
several important patterns to which we point. In the period covered by our data Luxembourg, 
France, Portugal and Great Britain have the lowest turnout rates, and Denmark, Greece, 
Belgium and Italy have the highest rates. Ireland and Great Britain exhibit the most variation 
in turnout, and Denmark, Greece, and Belgium have stable turnout levels over time.   
[Figure 1 here] 
The Independent Variable: Satisfaction with Democracy 
To test whether satisfaction relates to turnout, it is necessary to measure citizen 
satisfaction with democracy. The longitudinal measure of satisfaction with democracy derives 
from the Eurobarometer surveys from 1976 (the first year that the satisfaction with democracy 
item appears on the survey) until 2011.  In these surveys, approximately 2000 respondents per 
country each year were asked to place themselves on a 4 point scale with the question: “On 
the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with 
the way democracy works in our country”. Citizen satisfaction (i.e. satisfaction) is computed 
as the percentage of respondents who report that they are either “very” or “fairly” satisfied 
with democracy in a country election year. The wording of this question has remained 
consistent for the years of the investigation. Moreover, it is the same indicator that has been 
used in several related studies (see, e.g., Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Anderson and Guillory 
1997).  
The authors acknowledge scholarly reservations as to what this indicator actually 
measures (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svenson 1995; see also Cananche et al. 2001). A possible 
counterargument is that this question does not measure the legitimacy of the democratic 
system but rather support for the performance of the system (Linde and Ekman 2003; Norris 
1999). With respect to this point, we note that there is not a firm consensus against its use 
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(Blais and Gelineau 2007), and that supporters suggest that it remains a useful “hybrid” 
indicator of important aspects of system support. Along these lines, they have commented that 
it remains “a reasonable (albeit imperfect) measure” (Anderson 2002: 10). Also, it continues 
to be employed as the standard indicator in a number of recent studies (Kumlin and Esaiasson 
2012).  
Nevertheless, we address these criticisms from two angles: First, we estimate the 
parameters of model specifications below in which several factors (e.g. economic growth and 
unemployment levels) are included that control for “performance” related variation in the 
dependent variable. Second, to address potential problems with measuring citizen satisfaction 
with democracy we conducted additional “errors-in-variables” analyses (in the supplementary 
materials), making different assumptions about the assumed reliability of the measure of 
citizen satisfaction. Each set of analyses described above continue to support the substantive 
conclusions that are reported below.3  
The distributions of the satisfaction variable are presented in Figure 2 for the twelve 
countries in the analysis. The box plots represent reported satisfaction levels with democracy 
for the election years in each country, and they depict several important qualities of the 
satisfaction variable. In the period covered by our data, Italy is on average the country with 
the lowest citizen satisfaction, while Denmark and Luxembourg exhibit consistently high 
levels of satisfaction. Portugal, Germany and Spain exhibit the most variation in satisfaction 
                                                 
3
 While we analyze the direct effects of satisfaction with democracy on turnout, consideration of possible 
indirect effects -- relating to characteristics that may be correlated with satisfaction (in addition to performance 
indicators) which enhance turnout, such as political efficacy -- plausibly strengthens our conclusions. Suppose, 
for instance, that decreasing levels of citizens’ satisfaction with democracy are associated with decreasing levels 
of political efficacy, either because satisfaction with democracy exerts a causal influence on efficacy or because 
both satisfaction and efficacy are both influenced by some unmeasured variable (such as political scandals or 
politicians’ perceived responsiveness to citizens’ concerns). Given that political efficacy has been positively 
linked with turnout in many previous studies (see, e.g., Miller and Listhaug 1990), we would then expect that 
decreasing levels of satisfaction with democracy would exert an indirect effect that depresses voter turnout, via 
its relationship to political efficacy. Thus, our empirical estimate that decreasing satisfaction with democracy is 
in fact associated with increased turnout represents a conservative estimate of the magnitude of this effect, 
because our estimate also captures any indirect effects associated with the link between democratic satisfaction 
and political efficacy that plausibly cut in the opposite direction. While we account for economic factors, the 
Eurobarometer survey does not provide adequate coverage of the efficacy item (or variables such as civic duty or 
trust in government) to address this point directly in the empirical analysis. 
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across time, and Great Britain has rather stable satisfaction levels from one election year to 
another. 
[Figure 2 here] 
 Figure 3 maps the time series of voter turnout and citizen satisfaction with democracy 
from 1976-2011 in the 12 countries in the study. One clear pattern that emerges is that turnout 
is in decline, which is consistent with previous research.4 The pattern is not as striking for 
satisfaction with democracy, although we notice a discernable upward trend in most countries. 
We also observe that inter-election declines (increases) in the percentage of “satisfied” 
citizens tend to be accompanied by increases (declines) in turnout. The most notable examples 
are France and Great Britain where the two series mirror each other. When citizen satisfaction 
decreases in between elections, levels of turnout rise, or converge on the satisfaction line. 
Conversely, when levels of satisfaction increase, levels of turnout diverge sharply from the 
satisfaction line. Similar patterns emerge if one examines the series for Germany, 
Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, and Denmark. The mirroring patterns in Figure 3 provide a prima 
facie case for the Dissatisfied Voter Hypothesis (H2), however the next section analyzes 
changes in voter turnout more systematically.   
[Figure 3 here] 
Testing the Satisfied Voter Hypothesis and Dissatisfied Voter Hypothesis 
Recall that the Satisfied Voter Hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between 
(inter-election) changes in turnout and changes in citizen satisfaction, and the Dissatisfied 
Voter Hypothesis predicts a negative relationship. This latter expectation is at odds with 
predictions based on cross-national studies, where levels of satisfaction are linked to political 
engagement and turnout.  We estimate parameters of “cross-national” OLS regression models 
                                                 
4
 We address the implications of trending for our conclusions in the sensitivity analysis section and Appendix 2 
below. 
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to evaluate whether this relationship between citizen satisfaction and turnout is present at the 
aggregate level.5 This “cross-national” specification is:  
 
Turnout (t)   = B0 + B1 [Satisfaction (t)]                                                                  (1).   
 
where Turnout (t) is the level of  voter turnout in a country at the current election t. 
Satisfaction (t) is the level of citizen satisfaction with a democracy in a country at the current 
election. And to address the Satisfied Voter Hypothesis and Dissatisfied Voter Hypothesis, 
our basic specification is: 
 
∆ Turnout (t)   = B0 + B1 [∆ Satisfaction]                                             (2). 
H1: B1 > 0 
H2: B1 < 0 
 
In this model specification, we estimate “differences” in the variables of interest. A Dickey 
Fuller test of stationarity suggests that both series (turnout and satisfaction with democracy) 
are indeed non stationary.6 For turnout even the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 
does not seem to solve the stationarity problem. Differencing the two series is not only an 
                                                 
5
 One could argue that the theory is best tested at the aggregate level. To the extent that individual behavior is 
driven by expectations about the behavior of others, namely, under a collective action framework where social 
context matters for turnout (see, e.g., Franklin 2004: Chapter 2), a “climate” of citizen dissatisfaction may be 
conducive to turnout. The larger the pool of dissatisfied voters, the greater each dissatisfied voter’s utility will 
be, because it increases the probability that the dissatisfied group as a whole will be successful at communicating 
its preferences in the next election. One implication of this theory is that certain types of parties gain or lose 
votes when satisfaction in the electorate changes. For example, decreased levels of satisfaction might produce 
increases in the vote totals for anti-system parties more than it depresses the vote totals for pro-system parties, or 
decreased satisfaction could increase the vote totals for opposition parties more than it depresses the vote totals 
for governing parties. We acknowledge an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.  
Ideally, there would also be individual-level panel data to evaluate the hypotheses, and there are 
Swedish, German, British, Canadian, and New Zealand national election panel surveys available. However, most 
of these are not suitable for addressing the research question because the analysis requires individual-level 
measures -- pre- and post-election -- in two consecutive elections (i.e., a parallel analysis would require too 
many measures of the same individual than these surveys provide).  Where enough measurements do exist, in the 
internet panel of the British Election Study, individual turnout is significantly over-reported (92.5% in 2010 
when the actual figure is 68%), which suggests that it is unreliable.  Additionally, there is not enough variation in 
changes in reported turnout for a parallel analysis at the individual-level.      
6
 The presence of a unit root in both series cannot be rejected with probabilities of .73 and .41 respectively. 
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econometric necessity but it also makes theoretical sense. Substantively, our theory posits that 
inter-election changes in one variable influence inter-election changes in the other. 
Differencing the two series also deals with a problem of autocorrelation since a Wooldridge 
test of autocorrelation rejects the null hypothesis of no first order correlation with a 
probability of .003. Accordingly, we difference additional variables that are subsequently 
included in the models (e.g. ∆ Unemployment). If “levels” of variables are employed, instead 
of “differenced” variables, this does not change our substantive conclusions (Table 2 Column 
7, and Table 3 Column 7). The inclusion of turnout in the previous election year (t-1) for the 
parameter estimates for one of the models (Table 1 Model 4) serves only as an additional 
control variable and a more stringent test of our hypotheses.   
 
Results for the Cross-National and Basic Specifications 
The analysis encompassed 90 election year measures of citizen satisfaction in Britain, 
Italy, Denmark, Belgium, France, Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Ireland, and Germany in the period 1976-2011.7 These countries were selected based on the 
coverage of the Eurobarometer survey which consistently asks citizens to evaluate satisfaction 
with democracy with the same question dating back to the mid-1970s.    For the cross-
sectional models, Models 1-2, we pool these observations and cluster standard errors by 
country. For Models 3-4, where the variables have been differenced, we estimate robust 
standard errors and (given our emphasis on within country variation) control for country-
specific effects.8   
The parameter estimates for the cross-national specifications are presented in Columns 
1-2 of Table 1.  In the table, the coefficient estimating the effect of the satisfaction (t) variable 
                                                 
7
 Satisfaction estimates for Germany, post-1990, were calculated by combining East and West German 
Eurobarometer samples, and weighting them relative to their population size. 
8
 All of the models, except for Models 1-2 in Table 1, control for country-specific effects. We note that our 
substantive conclusions do not change if we do not control for these effects.  
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upon the turnout (t) variable is -0.14 and insignificant, however when we omit compulsory 
voting countries in Column 2 (see Blais 2000; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Franklin 2002; 
Powell 1982), the results conform to expectation, where the estimate on satisfaction (t) is +.30 
(p < .01). 9 Cross-nationally, the analysis supports the finding that citizen satisfaction is 
associated with higher levels of turnout.  
 The parameter estimates for the basic model specifications are presented in Columns 
3-4. The parameter estimates on the ∆ satisfaction variable are negative and statistically 
significant (B = -0.16, p < .01;  B = -.0.17, p < .01), which supports The Dissatisfied Voter 
Hypothesis (H2) that increases in citizen satisfaction with democracy decreases voter turnout.  
This finding is labelled the The Dissatisfied Voter Result.  These estimates are also 
substantively significant: in the bivariate model (Model 3), for example, a 10 percent increase 
in satisfaction is associated with a 1.6 percent decrease in turnout.  
[Table 1 here] 
Time between Elections, Competitiveness, Economic Conditions, and Party Polarization 
While the results reported above provide evidence that voter turnout varies with 
changes in citizen satisfaction, there are several alternative explanations that would account 
for turnout variations, including: the time between elections; the competitiveness of elections; 
economic conditions; and party polarization. We explore each of these explanations in turn. 
 
Time between Elections and Competitiveness  
Intuitively, turnout should increase as the time between national elections increases 
(Franklin 2002, 2004; Norris 2002).  For citizens, there are more years of policymaking at 
stake the larger the inter-election period. We measure time between elections in months.  The 
                                                 
9
 To ease the substantive interpretation of our results, we have stratified the sample.  When we estimate the 
model including an interaction between a compulsory voting dummy variable and satisfaction, our results remain 
unchanged. 
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competitiveness of elections should also enhance turnout (Blais 2000; Blais and Carty 1990; 
Geys 2006; Powell 1986).  The effects of competitive elections will appear on multiple levels 
of political competition. Voters are more likely to cast a deciding vote (even though this 
probability will remain very small). And various organizations -- like political parties and 
interest groups -- with a stake in the outcome will have greater incentives to mobilize their 
supporters. To measure competitiveness, we use the margin of victory, or the difference in 
vote percentage between the top two political parties.  
We estimate the parameters of model specifications, relating to the time in between 
elections and the competitiveness of the election, in Columns 1-2 of Table 2. In Column 1, the 
parameter estimates on the ∆ time between elections variable is positive and statistically 
significant which suggests that the time between elections contributes to voter turnout, i.e., as 
the number of months between elections increases (in relation to the time between elections in 
the previous inter-election period), voter turnout is expected to increase. If the estimate on the 
∆ competitiveness variable is negative, this suggests that as the difference between vote share 
between the first and second place candidates increases (i.e., the election is less competitive in 
comparison to the previous election), voter turnout decreases. The coefficient on the 
∆ competitiveness variable is negative and insignificant. More importantly, our results 
continue to provide evidence that decreases in aggregate satisfaction are associated with 
increases in turnout, i.e., these findings are consistent with the Dissatisfied Voter Hypothesis. 
In Columns 1-2 of Table 2, the coefficients on the variable ∆ satisfaction are negative and 
statistically significant (B = -0.20, p < .01; B = -0.15, p < .01).  
 
Economic Conditions 
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Economic adversity tends to suppress electoral participation (Rosenstone 1982).10  
∆ GDP (change in the GDP per capita from the year before the election to GDP per capita in 
the year of the election)11 and ∆ unemployment are included as independent variables in 
Column 3 Table 2 because a number of studies have established a connection between system 
support and economic conditions (see, e.g., Norris 1999). If this is the case then the economy 
could be the factor that is driving citizen satisfaction. The theoretical justification for 
including these variables is based on the distinction between diffuse and specific support for 
the system (Easton 1975). According to Easton, individual support towards a system either 
manifests itself as diffuse support that is, support for democracy as a concept, an arrangement 
of political life or as an ideal, or as support towards the output that the system provides 
(specific support), that is support for the performance of the system across a number of areas 
(note that Easton recognizes the possibility that the specific support fuses with diffuse support 
in the long-term).  Studies on support for institutions have stressed the importance that 
economic performance has for political trust and support (Clarke et al. 1993; Gilley 2006). 
Therefore, answers to the question “How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in 
your country?” will inevitably tap into perceptions of specific support and are likely to be 
driven, to an extent, by the general economic outlook and context in a given country at a 
given time. In order to adequately assess our hypothesis the model specification includes 
economic indicators on the right hand side of the equation. Measures of economic well-being, 
unemployment rates (∆ unemployment), and Growth (∆ GDP) are not only theoretically but 
also empirically relevant as previous studies have shown.12   
                                                 
10
 Additionally, several scholars have reported that wealthy countries have higher levels of turnout (Norris 2002; 
Powell 1982; Blais and Dobrzynksa 1998).  
11
 When we estimate the parameters of the full model specification based on inter-election changes in growth 
(∆GDPt  - ∆GDPt-1) the substantive results do not change.  
12
 For measures of unemployment and GDP per capita, we rely on publications from the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. 
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Accordingly, we estimate the parameters of the economic conditions specification in 
Column 3 of Table 2. The parameter estimates on the ∆ GDP variable are negative and 
insignificant. The coefficient on the ∆ unemployment variable is positive and statistically 
significant which suggests that turnout increases with higher levels of unemployment. Our 
results continue to provide evidence that a decrease in satisfaction is associated with an 
increase in turnout.  
   
Party Polarization 
Dalton (2008) and Steiner and Martin (2012) analyze turnout in the context of party 
system polarization. These authors argue that when party polarization decreases (or 
convergence increases), turnout drops because voters are “turned off” by a lack of ideological 
choice (see also Kittelson and Anderson 2011; Aarts and Wessels 2005).  Accordingly, we 
control for changing levels of polarization, ∆ polarization, on turnout. We rely on a measure 
of average party policy extremism that requires the ideological placements of parties, and the 
parties’ vote shares.  To measure party policy positions over time, we employ estimates from 
the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), which are reported in Budge et al. (2001) and 
Klingemann et al. (2006).13 In constructing a measure of party dispersion, scholars present 
different arguments about whether or not the parties’ positions should be weighted by their 
size (see Alvarez and Nagler 2004).14  Both of these arguments appear reasonable, and, 
consequently, below we report empirical analyses for both weighted and unweighted 
measures of average party extremism. Appendix 1 presents the equations for calculating these 
measures.  
                                                 
13
 We recalibrated the CMP estimates to fit on 1-10 scale using the following equation: (CMP estimate ×  9/200) + 
5.5.   
14
 The argument for weighting party system dispersion by party size is that such weighting accounts for the fact 
that the small parties in some countries have virtually no political influence.  The arguments for relying on an 
unweighted measure of party system dispersion are that a parties’ policy influence does not necessarily correlate 
with vote (or seat) share. Additionally, small parties provide a vehicle through which voters can express their 
policy preferences, regardless of whether or not such parties significantly influence government policy outputs. 
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We estimate the parameters of model specifications in Columns 4-5 of Table 2, 
including differenced versions of the Weighted and Unweighted Average Party Extremism 
variables (WPE and UPE), and we label this variable ∆ polarization.15 The parameter 
estimates for the ∆ polarization variable for Models 4-5 do not suggest that there is a 
systematic relationship between short-term changes in polarization and changes in turnout: 
one estimate is positive, and the other is negative, and each coefficient is insignificant. With 
respect to the relationship between citizen satisfaction and turnout, the negative and 
statistically significant estimates on the ∆ satisfaction variable in Models 4-5 continue to 
provide evidence that decreases in aggregate satisfaction are associated with increases in 
turnout, i.e., these findings are consistent with the Dissatisfied Voter Hypothesis.  
 
Full Model Specification and a Model Based on “Levels” of Variables 
Column 6 in Table 2 reports the parameter estimates for a Fully-Specified Model, which 
controls for all of the variables in the analyses, including ∆ time between elections, ∆ 
competitiveness, ∆ GDP, ∆ unemployment and ∆ polarization. Also, although our variables 
are measured in terms of “changes”, when corresponding model parameters are estimated in 
Column 7 of Table 2 including variables that are measured based on “levels” the results are 
unchanged. 
[Table 2 here] 
Measuring Satisfaction Directly Preceding the Election 
 The country election year measure of satisfaction is relied upon because it is based on 
very large samples of responses. However, it is possible that responses to the satisfaction 
question could be influenced by the outcomes of elections (Anderson and Guillory 1997). An 
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 We also note that similar versions of this measure have been employed in several other studies of policy 
dispersion (see, e.g., Ezrow 2007; Singh 2009).  
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alternative set of analyses were performed analyzing the Eurobarometer surveys 
(administered twice per year in the Spring and Autumn) that directly precede the focal 
election. Specifically, the parameters for the models in Table 2 were re-estimated using the 
Eurobarometer estimates of citizen satisfaction directly preceding the focal election. These 
estimates, which are reported in Table 3 (Models 1-7), continue to support our conclusions.16 
In addition we conduct supplementary analyses with respect to compulsory voting countries, 
turnout based on registered voters, trending, outliers, electoral systems, party system size, and 
“errors-in-variables”.17 The coefficient estimates for these model specifications on the ∆ 
satisfaction variable continue to support The Dissatisfied Voter Hypothesis (H2). 
 
[Table 3 here] 
Conclusion 
 
Voter turnout is widely viewed as an important indicator “of the health of a 
democracy” (Franklin 1999: 216; see also Powell 1986).  The contribution of this study is to 
suggest that changes in turnout are also important. Our analysis of changes in turnout 
suggests that elections are – not only a vehicle through which citizens participate and 
demonstrate their engagement, but also – a mechanism through which dissatisfaction with 
democracy is expressed. If citizens become dissatisfied, and they do not express this 
dissatisfaction at the polls, this would signal concern for democracy. We find that electorates 
in established democracies do tend to mark increasing dissatisfaction with democracy by 
participating in national elections. By contrast, the finding that electorates participate less in 
                                                 
16
 The use of the previous Eurobarometer might not be ideal because the timing of the previous measurement 
still ranges from a few days to many months before the election. Additionally, the estimates of satisfaction are 
based on far fewer respondents. 
17We present these analyses in supplementary materials that are available on a website associated with the 
authors.  
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elections when they are more satisfied with democracy is at odds with the traditional view 
that declining turnout should be seen negatively.18  
There are several reasons why our findings are important. First, the outcome of 
interest is electoral participation, and so the general arguments that electoral participation is 
important for a functioning democracy are relevant here (see Lijphart 1997, 1999; see also 
Norris 2002). Discussing the importance of voting, Russell Dalton (2006, p. 42) states that 
“voting will remain an important aspect of democratic politics as much for its symbolic value 
as for its instrumental influence on policy. Voting is the one activity that binds the individual 
to the political system and legitimizes the rest of the democratic process.”      
Second, the study identifies an additional normative standard for measuring the health 
of democracy. As noted, scholars widely view voter turnout as a bellwether for assessing the 
health of democracy. The implication of this study is that change in turnout, and its 
subsequent effects, is also important. If, in the presence of increased dissatisfaction, we do not 
observe an increase in voting to communicate dissatisfaction, then this may also be a cause 
for concern. Put differently, if citizens abstain from voting when they are dissatisfied, this 
would signal complete disengagement from the electoral process. The ballot should not only 
be seen as an expression of satisfaction with democracy and institutions, but also as a safety 
mechanism for instances in which discontent arises.  
 Third, this study is important because it suggests that, in addition to viewing causality 
cross-nationally, scholars of turnout must consider a temporal approach in assessing these 
crucial relationships. There are a number of cross-national studies that report a positive 
relationship between satisfaction and turnout (Birch 2010; Grönlund and Setälä 2007; Hadjar 
and Beck 2011). We evaluate whether the cross-national relationship between citizen 
                                                 
18
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to further consider the implications of our findings.   
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satisfaction and voter turnout directly translates into over-time relationships within a single 
country.  We find that it does not.   
The finding that declines (increases) in aggregate levels of satisfaction within 
democracies are associated with increases (declines) in levels of voter turnout within these 
democracies raises several interesting questions for future research. Our sample of 
democracies is limited in that we examine only established democracies. We might expect 
different relationships between changes in satisfaction and changes in turnout in different 
parts of the world. Newer democracies may not exhibit an increase in voting when aggregate 
levels of satisfaction decrease. As more longitudinal data becomes available, exploring 
additional variation in the relationship between changes in satisfaction and changes in turnout 
is an important next step.  
Finally, it may be that to give greater consideration to longitudinal variation may 
unlock some of the puzzles in the cross-national voter turnout literature. For example, it is 
well documented that voter turnout is decreasing (e.g. Franklin 2004).  This feature is 
surprising when we consider some of the cross-national conclusions about individual factors 
that contribute to turnout. Education and exposure to political information contributes to 
turnout, and these factors have been growing in developed democracies for the time period in 
which turnout is declining (Dalton 2002; see also Burden 2009).  Indeed it is difficult to 
logically “add up” the contradictory findings that aggregate levels of information and 
education are increasing, while voter turnout is simultaneously decreasing. Our analysis 
suggests that turnout may be decreasing in established democracies where citizen satisfaction 
with democracy is increasing, which would be consistent with the finding that increasing 
aggregate levels of education (accompanied by increasing satisfaction) would not necessarily 
produce subsequent increases in voting.  
19 
 
This study is the first to apply a temporal approach to parsing out the relationship 
between satisfaction and turnout. The temporal analyses support the opposite conclusion from 
the one that has been reached in previous cross-sectional studies, which suggests that it is 
important to distinguish between cross-national effects and longitudinal effects in future 
research on voter turnout. Finally, while we have identified an important aggregate pattern 
that enhances our understanding of changes in turnout, much more work needs to be done at 
the individual-level to fully explain our results. 
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Appendix 1. Measuring Average Party Extremism (Based on Ezrow 2007) 
 
The weighted measure of average party policy extremism (WPE) is defined as follows:  
 
Weighted Party Extremism = 
2)P- (P VS kjkj1j∑ =                             
 
where, 
_ 
Pk = the weighted mean of all the parties’ Left-Right ideological positions in country k.  
Pjk = the ideological position of party j in country k.  
VSj = Vote share for party j.  
 
The alternative to weighing parties’ positions by their vote shares is to weight all 
parties equally.  This measure is the unweighted measure of the average party policy 
extremism (UPE), and it is constructed as follows:  
Unweighted Party Extremism = 
n
kjk
1j
2)P- (P 
∑
=
                                         
 
where, 
n = the number of parties included in the analysis for country k.   
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Figure 1. Distribution of Turnout 
 
Notes. The boxes plot the percentages of election turnout in all the election years in each 
country between 1976 and 2011. There is an average of 6 election years in each country with 
a maximum of 13 (Denmark) and a minimum of 8 (France, UK, Spain and Portugal) in the 
time-period covered. The lines inside the boxes represent median values. The boxes depict the 
interquartile range of observations within each country, and the tips of the “whiskers” are the 
minimum and maximum values up to 1.5 times the interquartile range. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Satisfaction 
 
 
Notes. The boxes plot the percentages of those “very” and “fairly” satisfied with democracy 
in all the election years in each country between 1976 and 2011. There is an average of 6 
election years in each country with a maximum of 13 (Denmark) and a minimum of 8 
(France, UK, Spain, and Portugal) in the time-period covered. The lines inside the boxes 
represent median values. The boxes depict the interquartile range of observations within each 
country, and the tips of the “whiskers” are the minimum and maximum values up to 1.5 times 
the interquartile range (and the dots represent outliers). 
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Figure 3. Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy and Voter Turnout, 1976-2011 
 
Note: The 0-100 scale on the y-axis is the same scale for percentages of turnout and citizens that report that they are 
satisfied with democracy. Turnout is based on the percentage of Voting Age Population. Satisfaction with Democracy is 
calculated as the percentage of respondents that reported that they were “very” or “fairly” satisfied with democracy. 
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Table 1. Bivariate and Multivariate Analyses of Turnout 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, two-tailed test; Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The 
observations in Columns 1-2 are pooled and the standard errors are clustered by country. The 
compulsory voting countries that are omitted in the second model are Belgium, Italy, Greece, and 
Luxemburg. The models in Columns 3-4 control for country-specific fixed effects, and the dependent 
variable is ∆Turnout. Differenced variables are based on changes between elections.
 
Cross-National 
Models 
 Differencing Variables 
 
All 
Countries 
 
(1) 
Omit 
comp. 
voting 
(2) 
Bivariate 
 
 
(3) 
Including 
Lag DV 
 
(4) 
Satisfaction (t) 
 
-0.14 
(0.16) 
0.30*** 
(0.07) 
  
∆Satisfaction 
  
-0.16*** 
(0.05) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
∆Turnout (t-1) 
   
-0.13 
(0.08) 
Intercept 84.76*** 
(10.25) 
54.96*** 
(5.20) 
-1.43*** 
(0.38) 
-1.52*** 
(0.14) 
N 107 73 88 75 
R2 0.05 0.19 0.12 0.19 
Number of 
Countries 
  12 12 
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Table 2. Multivariate Analyses of Turnout: Competitiveness, Economic 
Conditions, Polarization, and Full Model Specifications 
  
Time 
between 
Competitiveness Economic 
Conditions 
WPE 
 
UPE Full 
 
Levels 
              
 
∆Satisfaction  -0.20*** -0.15*** -0.11** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.14** -0.17* 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) 
∆Time between elections 0.08**     0.09** -0.04* 
 
(0.03)     (0.03) (.0.02) 
∆Competitiveness  -0.09    -0.08 -0.07 
 
 (0.05)    (0.06) (0.12) 
∆ GDP    -0.10   -0.07 .03 
 
  (0.14)   (0.17) (0.19) 
∆Unemployment   0.73**   0.60** -.03 
 
  (0.27)   (0.26) (0.23) 
∆Polarization    1.13 -1.11 2.05 4.56* 
 
   (1.81) (1.57) (1.59) (2.19) 
        
Turnout t-1       .59*** 
       (0.08) 
Constant -1.35*** -1.49*** -0.73** -1.37*** -1.33*** -0.88** 34.98*** 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.30) (0.03) (0.04) (0.37) (9.24) 
 
       
Observations 88 88 64 85 85 61 73 
R-squared 0.23 0.16 0.33 0.17 0.17 0.47 .55 
Number of Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Notes. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, two-tailed test; Dependent variable is ∆Turnout. All models 
control for country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. 
“WPE” and “UPE” refer to the weighted and unweighted measures of average party extremism described 
in Appendix 1. Differenced variables are based on changes between elections except for ∆ GDP which is 
based on the difference in GDP from the year before the election to the year of the election (see footnote 
11). Weighted Average Party Extremism is the measure used in the full model specification. All of the 
variables in the “Levels” model specification in Column 7 are measured based on levels (instead of 
differences) of the variables. “Turnout t-1” is the proportion of eligible voters that voted in the previous 
election.  
  
31 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Multivariate Analyses of Turnout, Based on Eurobarometer Surveys 
Immediately Prior to National Elections 
 
  
Time 
between 
Competitiveness Economic 
Conditions 
WPE 
 
UPE Full 
 
Levels 
               
∆Satisfaction  -0.07* -0.07** -0.05* -0.07** -0.08* -0.04** -0.07** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆Time between elections 0.04*     0.07** 0.01 
 (0.02)     (0.02) (0.02) 
∆Competitiveness  -0.17**    -0.12* -0.14 
  (0.06)    (0.06) (0.11) 
∆ GDP    -0.01   -0.05 0.09 
   (0.15)   (0.21) (0.21) 
∆Unemployment   0.85***   0.71** 0.24 
   (0.21)   (0.23) (0.19) 
∆Polarization    2.29 0.47 2.17 4.29** 
    (1.47) (1.77) (1.31) (1.79) 
        
Turnout t-1       0.65*** 
       (0.10) 
Constant -1.53*** -1.62*** -0.93** -1.36*** -1.40*** -0.93** 20.15** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.30) (0.06) (0.06) (0.39) (8.08) 
        
Observations 96 96 72 92 92 69 77 
R-squared 0.09 0.14 0.30 0.13 0.09 0.43 .57 
Number of Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Notes. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, two-tailed test; Dependent variable is ∆Turnout. All models 
include country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. “WPE” and “UPE” refer 
to the weighted and unweighted measures of average party extremism described in Appendix 1. Weighted 
Average Party Extremism is the measure used in the full model specification. All of the variables in the 
“levels” model specification in Column 7 are measured based on levels (instead of differences) of the 
variables. “Turnout t-1” is the proportion of eligible voters that voted in the previous election.  
 
